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Introduction 
 
 
The Global Strategy for the EU’s 
Foreign and Security Policy 
Annegret Bendiek 
Just a few days after the Brexit referendum, the EU heads of state and government 
welcomed the “Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”. 
The document, which CFSP High Representative Federica Mogherini spent a year 
preparing, reads as yet another declaration of intent, calling for greater unity in the 
CFSP. It argues for what is at first glance an astonishingly defensive foreign policy 
orientation revolving around the concept of resilience. The upshot is a boost to trans-
atlantic security relations, especially between the EU and NATO. 
 
On 28 June 2016 the European Union un-
veiled its new Global Strategy for its foreign 
and security policy, adopting it as the nor-
mative framework for the future orienta-
tion of its Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP). The team of authors led by 
Nathalie Tocci, Deputy Director of the 
Istituto Affari Internazionali, built the 
strategy around the concept of resilience, 
in the sense of enhancing the EU’s ability 
to withstand internal and external threats. 
The document, which is not legally bind-
ing, replaces the European Security Strategy 
of 2003. A “strategy” is generally under-
stood as “a plan of action designed to 
achieve a long-term or overall aim” (Oxford 
Dictionaries). This document, however, 
largely lacks the core features of a strategy: 
a clearly stated objective, a defined (longer) 
timeframe, and a methodical approach. 
We read that the EU is to work for peace, 
security, prosperity, democracy and a rules-
based world order. The five priorities 
named for the EU’s external action are 
unsurprising: First of all, the CFSP is to im-
prove the Union’s security, specifically 
referring to measures addressing terrorism, 
hybrid threats, climate change, and energy 
security. As well as improving its defence 
capabilities, the document calls for the EU 
to step up its efforts in the area of cyber-
security and strategic communications. 
Secondly, the CFSP should seek to strength-
en the resilience of states and societies in 
the eastern and southern neighbourhood 
and stabilise fragile state structures there. 
Thirdly, a “comprehensive approach to 
conflicts and crises” is to be prepared, based 
on “broad, deep and durable regional and 
international partnerships”. Fourthly, the 
EU should make use of its experience with 
the peace-promoting effects of the integra-
tion process to support regional orders 
across the globe. And fifthly, through the 
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CFSP framework, the EU should advance 
the process of reforming global governance 
based on international law, in order to 
ensure respect for human rights and the 
principles of sustainable development, and 
to ensure “lasting access to the global 
commons”. 
With the Global Strategy the EU is re-
sponding to a sea-change in Europe’s over-
all political situation: collapsing states in 
the neighbourhood, international terror-
ism, Russia’s growing aggression in Eastern 
Europe and growing fears in Poland and 
the Baltic states that elements of “hybrid” 
warfare could be used to destabilise Euro-
pean societies. Hybrid threats are character-
ised by a mixture of coercion and subver-
sion, with conventional and unconven-
tional methods used by state and non-state 
actors – without crossing the threshold to 
an officially declared war. In parallel to 
these trends, voices within the EU increas-
ingly question its effectiveness as a level 
of political action. Not least the tangible 
possibility that the United Kingdom will 
likely complete its departure _from the 
Union by turning its back on the EU’s 
joint arms procurement efforts raises the 
question whether the EU is in fact in any 
position to organise defence in and around 
Europe. 
The EU Strategy and Criticisms 
of the Resilience Concept 
The Global Strategy’s responses to the 
challenges laid out above are full of ambi-
guities and unclarities. According to Micha-
el Hanisch from the Bundesakademie für 
Sicherheitspolitik, the analytical concept 
of resilience – which is central to the docu-
ment (thirty-four mentions) – denotes a 
“capacity for resistance and regeneration” 
or “crisis-resistance” in situations of disas-
ter and emergency. In security research the 
term is used to describe both the reactive 
capacity to respond to harm and the under-
lying ability to endure disaster. The Global 
Strategy sets high standards for the resil-
ience of the EU member states and their 
neighbours. It understands resilience as a 
broad concept that includes “all individuals 
and the whole of society”. A resilient society 
is defined as democratic, based on sustain-
able development and trust in institutions. 
According to the Global Strategy, a resilient 
Union is characterised by the ability to 
exert stabilising effects on its neighbours 
and to reform the structures of global 
governance such that they are in a position 
to secure access to the global commons. 
Security research goes further, understand-
ing resilience as both the ability to repel 
attack and endure and repair damage, as 
well as the ability to create structures that 
prevent such attacks and harm occurring 
in the first place. In order to achieve that 
state, the strategy argues, a comprehensive 
approach that integrates all relevant stake-
holders is required. 
This exceptionally broad approach is not 
unproblematic. Michael Hanisch rightly 
queries its benefits: “If everything and 
everyone is supposed to be resilient, where 
is the added value?” It is neither clear how 
far the concept extends, nor what recom-
mendations for action can be derived from 
it. Jochen Steinhilber of Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung sees the resilience paradigm as a 
“mantra” that threatens to become “an 
alternative to transformative approaches”. 
Sinan Ülgen of Carnegie Europe at least 
attributes the concept the potential to 
overcome the contradiction between pro-
moting stability and fostering democracy 
in third states. The resilience model, he 
argues, represents a leap forward, leaving 
behind the EU’s transformation approach. 
But what strategic interests should the EU 
pursue beyond creating stability? Goals 
(political stability) are often confused with 
interests (such as energy security). The 
European Council has instructed the High 
Representative, the Commission and the 
Council to “take the work forward”. Where 
the interests of the European Union itself 
are not clearly defined, it will be no easy 
task to align the approximately thirty 
existing sub-strategies of external action 
with the concept of resilience. 
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Terminological Unclarities 
A series of other terms appear in the Global 
Strategy, whose analytical vagueness re-
inforces the impression of strategic indeter-
mination in the CFSP and CSDP. There is 
talk of a “principled pragmatism” directing 
the strategy’s implementation, but without 
defining it in any detail. The EU is charged 
with achieving “strategic autonomy”. “De-
fence cooperation” should be “the norm”, 
but without any convincing description of 
how this grand ambition is to be achieved 
under conditions of resource scarcity, stra-
tegic discord between the member states 
and continuing adherence to consensus 
in decision-making. The two proposed 
measures are unconvincing. Mogherini 
advises a “networked” approach that covers 
all policy areas and seeks to connect inter-
nal and external security policy. The ques-
tion of what procedure would permit such 
far-reaching intervention in the political 
powers of the member states remains un-
answered. The second procedural recom-
mendation found in the strategy is that 
all the possibilities of the Treaty of Lisbon 
should be exhausted. These include en-
hanced cooperation in the CFSP and perma-
nent structured cooperation in the CSDP. 
The coordinating function of the European 
Defence Agency in arms and defence pro-
curement is also mentioned. The proposal 
to create a solid European defence industry 
is a goal already energetically pursued by 
the Juncker Commission via measures to 
promote research in the defence industry. 
At the same time it is also noted that mem-
ber states naturally remain “sovereign in 
their defence decisions”. 
This combination of analytical impreci-
sion and extremely ambitious political 
objectives (such as “strategic autonomy”) in-
evitably poses the question of the strategy’s 
actual utility and political orientation. 
Without a comprehensive European foreign 
and security policy, including a defence 
union with qualified majority decision-
making, the objective of “strategic autono-
my” remains worthless. One promising 
route was laid out in 2005–2010 with the 
Hague Programme for “strengthening free-
dom, security and justice in the European 
Union”. So why produce an analytically 
vague document whose goals are unrealis-
tic? Closer examination of the paper and 
consideration of the geopolitical context 
in which it appeared, however, permit 
another interpretation: The EU is only one 
pillar – and far from an autonomous one – 
in a European security architecture that 
also encompasses NATO, the OSCE and the 
Council of Europe, to name but the most 
important instances. It is an obvious con-
clusion that the EU’s future resilience 
efforts should concentrate on civil emer-
gency response while military action is con-
ducted in the scope of transatlantic coop-
eration in close collaboration with NATO. 
A New Relationship between 
EU and NATO 
In view of persistent strategic discord and 
the conviction that greater integration of 
the United States into European security 
policy is imperative, the European Council, 
meeting on 28 June in the presence of 
NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg, 
decided to further deepen relations be-
tween NATO and the European Union. In 
advance of the NATO summit on 8/9 July, 
US President Barack Obama met specially 
with Commission President Jean-Claude 
Juncker and EU Council President Donald 
Tusk. It is therefore unsurprising that the 
Warsaw NATO Summit decided to deepen 
cooperation with the Union. The coopera-
tion project builds on the Berlin Plus agree-
ment of 2003 and seeks to strengthen the 
European pillar of NATO. Both sides have 
agreed on accelerated cooperation in select-
ed areas, including defence against hybrid 
threats and cyber-attack, military assistance 
for third states, and maritime security. 
They also intend to cooperate more closely 
on intelligence matters, cyber-defence plan-
ning and the creation of resilient critical 
infrastructures. 
A large part of the Global Strategy is also 
dedicated to transatlantic relations and 
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NATO’s resurgent importance for Europe. 
It speaks of “deepening the transatlantic 
bond” (page 4), of NATO remaining “the 
primary framework for most Member 
States” (20), and member states’ defence 
planning and capacity development being 
conducted “in full coherence with NATO’s 
defence planning process” (46). A number 
of recent comments on the Strategy point 
to the connection between internal EU re-
forms and transatlantic cooperation. Sven 
Biscop sees the strengthening of coordina-
tion within the Union as a precondition for 
any form of meaningful cooperation with 
the United States. Ivo Daalder even speaks – 
under the impression of Brexit – of a “de-
fining moment” in transatlantic coopera-
tion. And according to Daniel Keohane, 
the Global Strategy underlines that NATO 
remains the principal anchor of European 
defence and security. 
All this leads to the conclusion that the 
concept of resilience – upon which the 
Strategy concentrates so strongly – ulti-
mately serves little purpose beyond conceal-
ing the CFSP’s fundamental repositioning in 
relation to NATO. In future it will no longer 
be possible to conceive Europe’s overall 
foreign and security policy as a European 
alternative to transatlantic security coopera-
tion. The European Union’s “Global Strate-
gy” has been given a defensive military 
orientation, for which the resilience con-
cept stands as shorthand. However, this 
reservation must be interpreted in the con-
text of the simultaneous intention to tie 
the CFSP closer to NATO. From this perspec-
tive the resilience concept very quickly loses 
its apparently pathbreaking relevance for 
the underlying orientation of the Global 
Strategy. Instead it is better understood as 
an expression of a new division of labour 
between NATO and CFSP, where Europe ties 
itself much more closely to NATO and con-
centrates its real defence efforts within the 
Alliance. As such, Europe setting the stage 
for a “security community” where the 
Union takes responsibility for civil resil-
ience, while NATO creates the superstruc-
ture for Europe’s military defence. 
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